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http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27114/27114-h/27114-h.html#toc55
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ALEXANDER THE GREAT
His conquests and dominions were, however, prepared by one perhaps greater than himself in creative genius, and as unscrupulous and cruel as he. Philip found his kingdom a little brook; he left it a river—broad, deep, and grand. Under Alexander, this river became an irresistible torrent, sweeping every thing away which impeded its course. Philip created an army, and a military system, and generals, all so striking, that Greece succumbed before him, and yielded up her liberties. Alexander had only to follow out his policy, which was to subdue the Persians. The Persian empire extended over all the East—Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Parthia, Babylonia, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Bactria, and other countries—the one hundred and twenty provinces of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus, from the Mediterranean to India, from the Euxine and Caspian Seas to Arabia and the Persian Gulf—a monstrous empire, whose possession was calculated to inflame the monarchs who reigned at Susa and Babylon with more than mortal pride and self-sufficiency. It had been gradually won by successive conquerors, from Nimrod to Darius.
It was the gradual absorption of all the kingdoms of the East in the successive Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian empires—for these three empires were really one under different dynasties, and were ruled by the same precedents and principles. The various kingdoms which composed this empire, once independent, yielded to the conquerors who reigned at Babylon, or Nineveh, or Persepolis, and formed satrapies paying tribute to the great king. The satraps of Cyrus were like the satraps of Nebuchadnezzar, members or friends of the imperial house, who ruled the various provinces in the name of the king of Babylon, or Persia, without much interference with the manners, or language, or customs, or laws, or religion of the conquered, contented to receive tribute merely, and troops in case of war. And so great was the accumulation [pg 375]of treasure in the various royal cities where the king resided part of the year, that Darius left behind him on his flight, in Ecbatana alone, one hundred and eighty thousand talents, or two hundred million dollars. It was by this treasure that the kings of Persia lived in such royal magnificence, and with it they were able to subsidize armies to maintain their power throughout their vast dominions, and even gain allies like the Greeks, when they had need of their services. Their treasures were inexhaustible—and were accumulated with the purpose of maintaining empire, and hence were not spent, but remained as a sacred deposit.
It was to overthrow this empire that Philip aspired, after he had conquered Greece, in part to revenge the injuries inflicted by the Persian invasions, but more from personal ambition. And had he lived, he would have succeeded, and his name would have been handed down as the great conqueror, rather than that of his more fortunate son. Philip knew what a rope of sand the Persian military power was. Xenophon had enlightened the Greeks as to the inefficiency of the Persian armies, if they needed any additional instruction after the defeat of Xerxes and his generals. The vast armies of the Persians made a grand show, and looked formidable when reviewed by the king in his gilded chariot, surrounded by his nobles, the princes of his family, and the women of his harem. And these armies were sufficient to keep the empire together. The mighty prestige attending victories for one thousand years, and all the pomp of millions in battle array, was adequate to keep the province together, for the system of warfare and the character of the forces were similar in all the provinces. It was external enemies, with a different system of warfare, that the Persian kings had to dread—not the revolt of enervated States, and unwarlike cities. The Orientals were never warlike in the sense that Greece and Rome were. The armies of Greece and Rome were small, but efficient. It was seldom that any Grecian [pg 376]or Roman army exceeded fifty thousand men, but they were veterans, and they had military science and skill and discipline. The hosts of Xerxes or Darius were undisciplined, and they were mercenaries, unlike the original troops of Cyrus.
Now it was the mission of Alexander to overturn the dynasties which reigned so ingloriously on the banks of the Euphrates—to overrun the Persian empire from north to south and east to west—to cut it up, and form new kingdoms of the dismembered provinces, and distribute the hoarded treasures of Susa, Persepolis, and Ecbatana—to introduce Greek satraps instead of Persian—to favor the spread of the Greek language and institutions—to found new cities where Greeks might reign, from which they might diffuse their spirit and culture. Alexander spent only one year of his reign in Greece, all the rest of his life was spent in the various provinces of Persia. He was the conqueror of the Oriental world. He had no hard battles to fight, like Cæsar or Napoleon. All he had to do was to appear with his troops, and the enemy fled. Cities were surrendered as he approached. The two great battles which decided the fate of Persia—Issus and Arbela—were gained at the first shock of his cavalry. Darius fled from the field, in both instances, at the very beginning of the battle, and made no real resistance. The greater the number of Persian soldiers, the more disorderly was the rout. The Macedonian soldiers fought retreating armies in headlong flight. The slaughter of the Persians was mere butchery. It was something like collecting a vast number of birds in a small space, and shooting them when collected in a corner, and dignifying the slaughter with a grand name—not like chasing the deer over rocks and hills.
The military genius of Alexander was seen in the siege of the few towns which did resist, like Tyre and Gaza; in his rapid marches; in the combination of his forces; in the system, foresight, and sagacity he displayed, conquering at the light time, marching upon [pg 377]the right place, husbanding his energies, wasting no time in expeditions which did not bear on the main issue, and concentrating his men on points which were vital and important. Philip, if he had lived, might have conquered the Persian empire; but he would not have conquered so rapidly as Alexander, who knew no rest, and advanced from conquering to conquer, in some cases without ulterior objects, as in the Indian campaigns—simply from the love and excitement of conquest. He only needed time. He met no enemies who could oppose him—more, I apprehend, from the want of discipline among his enemies, than from any irresistible strength of his soldiers, for he embodied the conquered soldiers in his own army, and they fought like his own troops, when once disciplined. Nor did he dream of reconstruction, or building up a great central power. He would, if he had lived, have overrun Arabia, and then Italy, and Gaul. But he did not live to measure his strength with the Romans. His mission was ended when he had subdued the Persian world. And he left no successor. His empire was divided among his generals, and new kingdoms arose on the ruins of the Persian empire
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